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victim protection and provide judicial review in all illegal searches
and seizures. Excluding flagrant violations would protect the integrity
of the judicial system and remove the court from any participation
in the Rochin45 type case-the case in which evidence is obtained by
means that "shock the conscience." Since such police conduct would
be oblivious to a tort remedy justice would be better served by
excluding the evidence.
Dennis C. Sauter

Contracts-Parol Evidence RuleAdmissibility of Agency Not Appearing in Written Contract
How does the parol evidence rule1 apply to a written contract
which on its face appears to have only two parties, but in which one
of the parties wants to introduce extrinsic evidence that one of the
signatories is an agent for another person? Part one of this note will
discuss present case law and part two will show how that law compares with modem theories of the parol evidence rule.
4

- Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Police illegally broke into
Rochin's home, attempted to forcibly open his mouth to extract pills, and
subsequently pumped his stomach.
1 The rule as it is often stated with respect to contracts is that "extrinsic
evidence is not admissible to vary, add to, modify, or contradict a valid,
complete, unambiguous, written contract." See 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 901
(1964) and cases cited therein at n.21. The Uniform Commercial Code
[UCC] statement of the parol evidence rule for sales is UCC § 2-202: "Terms
with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or
which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented (a) by
course of dealing or usage of trade . . . or by course of performance . . .;
and (b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the
writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of
the terms of the agreement." Notice particularly the "official" comments to
§ 2-202 which reject the idea that the court must find ambiguity in the contract
language before admitting extrinsic evidence and the idea that language
should be given a construction contrary to the meaning arising out of the
commercial context in which it was used. The comments also state that the
best indication of what the parties intended is their course of actual performance. In addition it is stated that extrinsic evidence should be kept
from the trier of facts only when the "additional terms are such that, if
agreed upon, they would certainly have been included in the document ....
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-202, Comments 1-3 (emphasis supplied).
The Uniform Commercial Code provision dealing with the signing of commercial paper by an agent is UCC § 3-403. For other statements of the
parol evidence rule for contracts, see 3 A. CORIN, CONTRACTS § 573 (1960); 4
S. WiLiSTON, CoNTrcrs § 631 (3d ed. 1961).
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I. TH

DECISIONS

There are three contexts in which the courts have discussed
the parol evidence rule in such contracts: (1) where one signing
party, T, wants to show that the other signer, A, is an agent of the
principal, P, in order to hold P liable; (2) where P wants to introduce
evidence of the agency in order to entitle himself to hold T liable,
and (3) where A wants to introduce evidence that he is merely an
agent so as to relieve himself from personal liability to the other
signing party T Where the phrases "disclosed principal" and "undisclosed principal" are used, they have nothing to do with what is in
the writing. In all the cases to be discussed below, there were no
words in the writing which indicated that an agency relationship
might exist. A casual reader of the writings would quickly conclude
that they had only two parties--the two signing parties. "Disclosed
principal" means only that the two signing parties knew when they
executed the writing that one of them was acting as the agent of
another person, P, whose identity may or may not have been known
to the other signing party, T.
In the first situation, where T wants to introduce evidence of a
disclosed agency relationship in order to hold P liable, there is a
split of authority.' For example, in Schneider Marble Co. v. Knight,4
2 As a general rule, if the evidence of the agency relationship is before
the court, the agent making a contract for a disclosed principal is not personally
liable on the contract. Mosekian v. Davis Canning Co., 229 Cal. App. 2d 118,
40 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Rayden Engineering Corp. v.
Church, 337 Mass. 652, 151 N.E.2d 57 (1958); Azzarello v. Richards, 99
N.Y.S.2d 597 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1950); REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY
§ 320 (1958).
3 Evidence admitted: Moore v. Consolidated Products Co., 10 F.2d 319
(8th Cir. 1925); Schneider Marble Co. v. Knight, 37 Ga. App. 646, 141 S.E.
420 (1928); Winston & Co. v. Clark County Const. Co., 186 Ky. 743, 217
S.W. 1027 (1920); Woodhouse v. Duncan, 106 N.Y. 527, 13 N.E. 334 (1887).
Evidence excluded: Bloom v. Coates, 190 Cal. 458, 213 P. 260 (1923);
Ferguson v. McBean, 91 Cal. 63, 27 P. 518 (1891); Cartwright v. Giacosa,
216 Tenn. 18, 390 S.W.2d 204 (1965); see also 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2438 (3d ed. 1940), where it is indicated that if the parties were aware of
the agency at the time of entering the contract and did not put some indication
of the agency into the writing, parol evidence could not be used to hold the
principal liable. In addition it should be remembered that the above cases do
not apply to negotiable instruments. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law
[NIL] and UCC, no person may be held liable on a negotiable instrument
whose name does not appear thereon. See UCC § 3-401 and NIL § 18. In
those few cases where one of the signing parties entered the contract not
knowing of the other's agency, there is no clear trend. In Pittman v. Roberts,
122 So. 2d 333 (Fla. App. 1960), the evidence was admitted. In Shinn v.
Smiley, 1 NJ. Misc. 459, 122 A. 531 (1922), it was excluded.
4 37 Ga. App. 646, 141 S.E. 420 (1928).
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where an individual signed a contract for purchase of a war memorial
with the seller's knowledge that he was acting for a committee, the
Georgia Court of Appeals held parol evidence admissible to render
the members of the committee liable on the contract. However, in
Cartwright v. Giacosa,5 the plaintiff contracted to purchase land from
the defendants, husband and wife. The husband signed the contract
but the wife did not. When the defendants refused to convey, the
plaintiff sued for specific performance. The plaintiff claimed that
the husband signed both as owner and as agent for his wife. The
Tennessee court held that where there was nothing in the contract
to indicate that the wife was a party, extrinsic evidence was not admissible to show that the husband was acting as her agent.
In the second context the principal wants to introduce evidence
of an agency relationship in order to hold the other signing party, T,
liable. The general rule is that this evidence is admissible.' In
Ford v. Williams," the principal sued a party who had entered a
written contract to purchase flour from his agent. Although the other
party at the time of executing the contract was unaware of the
agency, the United States Supreme Court admitted the evidence.
The Court stated that the evidence did not contradict the writing
but merely explained it, and that the effect of the evidence was not
to discharge the signing parties from liability, but to show that
another party, P, could hold T liable.8
In the third context, where the agent seeks to introduce the
agency in order to relieve himself from liability on the contract, the
courts considering the question refused to admit the evidence."
In Bulwinkle & Co. Cramer & Blohme,'0 the defendant agent, signing
his own name, contracted to sell corn to plaintiff. When the corn was
1216
Tenn. 18, 390 S.W.2d 204 (1965).
6
E.g., Ford v. Williams, 21 How. (62 U.S.) 287 (1858); Brooks v.
Minturn, 1 Cal. 481 (1851); Genova v. Johnson, 213 Ore. 47, 321 P.2d 1050
(1958); Weiss v. Gumbert, 191 Ore. 119, 227 P.2d 812 (1951); Barbre v.
Goodale, 28 Ore. 465; 38 P. 67, 43 P. 378 (1896).
721 How. (62 U.S.) 287 (1858).
8
Id. at 289.
9 Nash v. Towne, 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 689 (1866); Ricker v. B-W Acceptance Corp., 349 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1965); Western Mach. Co. v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 254 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1957); Pickands, Mather &
Co. v. H. A. & D. W. Kuhn & Co., 8 F.2d 704 (6th Cir. 1925); Martindell v.
Bodrero, 256 Cal. App. 2d 56, 63 Cal. Rptr. 774 (1967); Bostwick Banking
Co. v. Arnold, 227 Ga. 18, 178 S.E.2d 890 (1970); Spiegel v. Hayes, 103
Ga. App. 293, 119 S.E.2d 123 (1961); Mid-America Corp. v. Miller, 372
P.2d 14 (Okla. 1962); Bulwinkle & Co. v. Cramer & Blohme, 27 S.C. 376, 3
S.E. 776 (1887); Cream City Glass Co. v. Friedlander, 84 Wis. 53, 54 N.W.
28 (1893); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 323 (1958).
1027 S.C. 376, 3 S.E. 776 (1887).
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found defective, plaintiff brought an action for damages. Defendant
attempted to introduce oral testimony of an understanding between
the parties that defendant was merely an agent and was not to be
held personally liable. In excluding the evidence the South Carolina
court quoted Nash v. Towne:" "'Parol evidence can never be admitted for the purpose of exonerating an agent, who has entered
into a written contract in which he appears as principal, even though
he should propose to show, if allowed, that he disclosed his agency
and mentioned the name of his principal at the time the contract was
executed." 12
Although there are no West Virginia cases involving contracts
unambiguously appearing to have only two parties, dicta in related
cases suggest what the West Virginia high court might do. In Deitz
v. Providence Washington Insurance Co., 3 plaintiff, who had no
title and thus no insurable interest in a house, purchased insurance
in his own name for his wife, the record owner. When the house
burned, the insurer refused to pay and the husband brought an
action for his wife's benefit. The court held extrinsic evidence admissible to entitle the agent-husband to hold the insurer liable. The
court stated: "[P]arol evidence is admissible for the purpose of introducing a new party, but never for discharging an apparent party
to the contract."14 This statement would seem to indicate that the
court might allow a principal to sue the third party on the contract
but would not allow the agent to introduce the agency in order to
escape liability. In Clark v. Talbott," the defendant signed a note,
"W.M. Talbott, Agt." The court allowed the defendant to show that
he had signed as agent for another in order to escape liability. However the court said: "If a simple contract, on its face, is the undertaking of the agent only, no reference being made on its face to
representative capacity, parol evidence will not be received to exonerate the agent .... ,"
H.

EVALUATION

The decisions cannot be reconciled among themselves. Where
T or P wants to introduce the agency, many courts allow the in"' 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 689 (1866).
12 27 S.C. at 385, 3 S.E. at 780.
13 31 W. Va. 851, 8 S.E. 616 (1888).
14 Id. at 855, 8 S.E. at 619.
15 72 W. Va. 46, 77 S.E. 523 (1913).
16 1d. at 50, 77 S.E. at 525.
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troduction of the evidence, but where A seeks to introduce the
agency, the courts zealously refuse to admit the evidence. Those
courts which admit the evidence in the first two situations usually
justify their decisions on the theory that the introduction is not a
variation of the terms of the written contract but is merely "identifying the real party in interest."'" This may be true, but it is equally true
in the third situation. In all three situations, the facts to be introduced
-facts probative of the existence of the agency-are the same. If that
creates a variance or contradiction of terms when introduced by the
agent, then it likewise creates a variance when introduced by the
principal or third party.
Another problem with the decisions is that the introduction of
the agency relationship may not violate the parol evidence rule.
The rule is not evidentiary but substantive.' 8 The usual statement
of the rule is misleading because it purports to deal with the admissibility of evidence when in fact the primary thrust of the rule
is to deal with its effect. Admissibility is only secondary. A more
correct statement of the rule would be that extrinsic evidence of
prior agreements is not effective to vary a written contract; therefore
it is inadmissible. Professor Corbin claims that the parol evidence
rule is really only a confusing way of stating the obvious substantive
contract principle' 9 that the latest agreement of the parties governs."

See, e.g., Pittman v. Roberts, 122 So. 2d 333 (Fla. App. 1960).
]8 As Dean Wigmore stated:
[T]he rule is in no sense a rule of Evidence, but a rule of Substantive
Law. It does not exclude certain data because they are for one or
another reason untrustworthy or undesirable means of evidencing
some fact to be proved. It does not concern a probative mental
process,-the process of believing one fact on the faith of another.
What the rule does is to declare that certain kinds of fact are legally
ineffective in the substantive law; and this of course (like any other
ruling of substantive law) results in forbidding the act to be proved
at all.
9 J. WicMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2400 at 3 (3d ed. 1940).
9
A prior contract is discharged by a subsequent inconsistent contract
insofar as they are inconsistent. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Stewart, 262
F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1959); Realty Corp. of America v. Burton, 162 Cal. App.
2d 44, 327 P.2d 948 (1958); Hulcher v. Adcock, 25 IIl. App. 2d 255, 166
N.E.2d 168 (1960); Martin v. Peyton, 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927);
Levicoff v. Richard L Rubin & Co., 413 Pa. 134, 196 A.2d 359 (1964); United
Fuel Gas Co. v. Ledsome, 109 W. Va. 14, 153 S.E. 303 (1930); Simpson v.
Mann, 71 W. Va. 516, 76 S.E. 895 (1912); Myers v. Carnahan, 61 W. Va.
414, 57 SM. 134 (1907). The prior contract or understanding, having been
discharged, is irrelevant for the purpose of contradicting the later contract.
1
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This is true whether the antecedent negotiations or agreements are
written or verbal, and whether the later contract is written or verbal.'
The act which removes the legal efficacy from the incomplete prior
negotiations or contracts of the parties is called the integration.22
Both Professors Williston and Corbin, the foremost theoreticians of
the parol evidence rule, agree that integration depends on the intent
of the parties.23 However, even though they agree on the importance
of "intent," they attach different meanings to that word. 4 Professor

Thus the prior contract terms are inadmissible. See 9 J. WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE

9 2400 (3d ed. 1940) and 1 J.WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2 (3d ed. 1940). This

principle has four parts: (1) Evidence of a prior oral contract or understanding, Ci, is inadmissible to contradict a later oral contract, C.. (2) Evidence of a prior written contract, C, is inadmissible to contradict a later oral
contract. Most of the, cases cited above in this footnote stand for the rule that
a written contract is discharged by a later oral contract. Under the rule of
evidence stated above, the terms of such prior written contracts would be
irrelevant to disprove the later oral contract. (3) Evidence of a prior written
contract, C1 , is inadmissible to contradict a later written contract. This is
simply another way of stating the settled rule that the parol evidence rule
prevents the introduction of prior written as well as oral evidence of C, to
contradict a later written contract, C.. (4) Evidence of a prior oral contract
or understanding, C1, is inadmissible to contradict a later written contract, C2.
This is the classic parol evidence rule.
20
"Any contract, however made or evidenced, can be discharged or
modified by subsequent agreement of the parties. No contract whether oral
or written can be varied, contradicted, or discharged by an antecedent agreement. Today may control the effect of what happened yesterday; but what
happened yesterday cannot change the effect of what happens today. This, it
is believed, is the substance of what has been unfortunately called the 'parol
evidence rule."' 3 A. ConniN, CoNTRAcTs § 574, at 371-72 (1960). Professor
Corbin states that "this is the ordinary substantive law of contracts; it is not a
rule of evidence and is not stated in the language of evidence, parol or
otherwise." Id. at 375.
21 "It should be clearly observed that a written integration has no greater
effect upon antecedent parol understandings and agreements than a parol
integration has upon antecedent written agreements. In both cases alike, the
later agreement discharges the antecedent ones in so far as it contradicts or
is inconsistent with the earlier ones. In both cases alike, the later agreement
must be shown to have been in fact made, that its terms were assented to,

especially those terms that vary or contradict antecedent expressions and agreements.'

Id. at 369.

22"This

process of embodying the terms of a jural act in a single memorial

may be termed the Integration of the act, i.e. its formation from scattered
parts into an integral documentary unity. The practical consequence of this is
that its scattered, parts, in their former and inchoate shape, do not have any

jural effect .... 9 J.WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2400 at 76 (3d ed. 1940).

23 Calamari & Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Ride and
Principlesof Contract Interpretation,42 IND. L 1. 333 (1967); 4 S. WmLisToN,

CoNTRACrs § 633 (3d ed. 1961); 3 A. CORBiN, CONTRACrs H9 573-96 (1960).
24

Calamari & Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and
Principles of Contract Interpretation,42 IND. LJ. 333 (1967).
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Williston prescribes certain tests25 by which one supposedly can
determine the parties' intent from the written memorial alone. On
the other hand, Professor Corbin believes that "intent" means the true
intent of the parties, and that such intent can never be established
merely by looking at a document but must always be established by
extrinsic evidence.26
If the courts were to use the Corbin analysis, evidence of the
agency relationship would be admissible in those cases where T knew
that A was P's agent. Since they entered the contract with full
knowledge of the agency, it could hardly be contended that they
intended that a writing which made no reference to the agency was
assented to as a complete expression of the agreement between them.
A Williston analysis might lead to a different result. Under this
approach, the evidence would be admissible if "the alleged additional
terms were such as might naturally be made as a separate agreement
by parties situated as were the parties to the written contract."2'
However, no matter what the result, the Williston method of analysis
is itself questionable since it purports to determine intent from only
the writing and the opinion of the court as to what agreements would
naturally be made separate from the writing, while rejecting the best
source of evidence as to intent, the testimony of the parties themselves.28
The history of the parol evidence rule suggests another reason
for disregarding the rule in these situations. Many of the historical
25 Id. at 338:

(1) If the writing expressly declares that it contains the entire
agreement of the parties (what is sometimes referred to as a merger
clause), the declaration conclusively establishes that the integration
is total unless the document is obviously incomplete or the merger
clause was included as a result of fraud or mistake or any other
reason exists that is sufficient to set aside a contract. . . . (2) In
the absence of a merger clause, the determination is made by looking
to the writing. Consistent additional terms may be proved if the
writing is obviously incomplete on its face or if it is apparently complete but, as in the case of deeds, bonds, bills and notes, expresses
the undertaking of only one of the parties. (3) Where the writing
appears to be a complete instrument expressing the rights and obligations of both parties, it is deemed a total integration unless the
alleged additional terms were such as might naturally be made as a
separate agreement by parties situated as were the parties to the
written contract.
See 42 S. WmLISTON, CoNTRAcrs §§ 633, 636, 638, 645 (3d ed. 1961).
6 Calamari & Perillo, supra note 23 at 339; 3 A. CoRBiN, CONTRACTS §
582 2(1960).
7
Calamari & Perillo, supra note 23 at 338; 4 S. WILU.STON, CoNTRAcTs §
638 (3d ed. 1961).
28 3 A. CoRr N, CoNTRAcTs § 573.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1971

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 74, Iss. 1 [1971], Art. 15
STUDENT NOTES

forces which gave rise to the rule are no longer in existence. One
of those forces was the primitive state of oral proof in trials.29
Witnesses could not state the facts as they knew them but could simply
swear their support for the contentions of one of the parties."
Evidence was admitted by way of documents and written averments
in the pleadings rather than by oral testimony. This restricted use
of oral proof made it difficult to prove prior oral contracts and
negotiations for which there was no documentary support. A related
problem was caused by the concept that juries were free to reach
verdicts on facts known to them but not proven at trial. If an advocate could get statements contrary to the writing before the jury, he
could plant the seed of doubt that might lead to an unjust verdict,
even though the substance of the oral averments might not be proven.
Thus, the courts originated the parol evidence rule to keep such oral
statements from the jury.'
These situations no longer present a problem. In the modem
trial, where oral testimony can easily be introduced to corroborate
or contradict any oral averments as to the existence of the agency
relationship, the danger that an unsubstantiated oral statement will
lead to an incorrect verdict is considerably lessened. Moreover, as
Professor Corbin stated, it is "a question of weight of evidence, not
of admissibility." 2
Probably the real reason that the courts refuse to allow the
agent to introduce evidence of the agency relationship is the implicit
assumption that since he signed the writing in his own name, he is a
party to the contract and therefore should be held liable. This unspoken assumption arises from the idea that the writing, rather than
being only evidence of the contract, actually constitutes the contract, and that this written "contract is superior to the oral agreements.
The idea that the writing actually becomes the contract had
its inception as a result of the Statute of Frauds." However, except
as a shorthand method of stating how the parties have evidenced their
agreement (by audible words or words written on paper), the con29 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 177-219.

30 1d. at 178.
31 Id. at 176.
32 3 A. CoRBN, Co mAcrs § 573, at 362 (1960).
33 9 J. WIGMORE, EvmENcE § 2425 (3d ed. 1940).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol74/iss1/15

8

